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litigation against service providers.
With such a standard, the service
providers incur liability any time any
one of its subscribers notified it that
he or she was bothered by another
party's posting. Consequently,
deciding what information was
derogatory, defamatory or offensive
burdens providers. Again, the court
concluded that such a consequence
of notice liability was contrary to
Congress's intent to encourage selfregulation.
CourtAlso Rejected Claim
That § 230 Cannot BeApplied Retroactively
Zeran argued that the law did not
apply retroactively in this case
because the cause of action predated
it. Congress enacted the CDA and it

became effective February 8, 1996.
Zeran filed his claim on April 23,
1996, nearly a year after the original
posting of the defamatory message.
The court, however, disagreed with
Zeran. The court decided that
Congress felt so strongly about the
need to protect free speech on the
Internet and the need to encourage
self-regulation that Section 230
immediately applied on any claim
brought forward since its enactment.
The court also examined this case
in light of the framework of
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S.
Ct. 1483 (1994). The decision in
Landgrafasserted that for preenactment events, the courts must
decide whether Congress effectively
stated what the statute's reach should
be. In applying this to Section 230,

the Fourth Circuit ruled that
Congress unquestionably designed
the statute to apply to any claim
filed after the statute's enactment,
even if the cause of action occurred
prior to that date. Thus, the court
concluded that retroactivity was not
an issue in this case.
After considering Congress's
purpose in enacting Section 230 and
examining the language of the
statute, the Fourth Circuit ruled that
liability did not extend to AOL for
offensive material posted on their
service by a third party. The court
determined that AOL was a publisher and that Section 230 protected
AOL. Thus, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the judgment on the
pleadings in favor of AOL.

Posting Information on Internet Does Not
Establish Personal Jurisdiction
by Zachary Raimi
The rise of the Internet, which
has dramatically changed the way
people communicate and conduct
business, has impacted the law and
legal proceedings. In Cybersell,Inc.
v. Cybersell,Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th
Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held
that an Arizona court could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over a
Florida corporation, which advertised over the Internet, when it used
Plaintiff's trademark on an Internet
site. The court determined that, even
though Internet users could access
the company's web page in Arizona,
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a company may not be sued unless it
takes affirmative steps to avail itself
to the laws and benefits of that state.

Two Companies
Same Name -

-

With

Clash Over

Trademark Infringement,
Jurisdiction
On January 9, 1996, Cybersell,
Inc. ("Cybersell AZ"), an Arizona
corporation, sued Cybersell, Inc., a
Florida corporation ("Cybersell
FU'), in a federal district court in

Arizona. Cybersell AZ alleged that
Cybersell FL engaged in "trademark
infringement, unfair competition,
fraud, and RICO violations."
Cybersell FL sought dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The
court granted Cybersell FL's motion,
and Cybersell AZ appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.
The lawsuit traces its history to
May 1994, when Cybersell AZ was
incorporated to provide Internet
advertising and marketing services.
On August 8, 1994, Cybersell AZ
applied for the service mark
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"Cybersell." The Patent and Trade
Office approved its application in
October 1995. From August 1994 to
February 1995, Cybersell AZ
maintained a web page using the
"Cybersell" mark. Subsequently, the
company removed the page for
reconstruction.
Unaware of Cybersell AZ's
existence, two Florida residents
created Cybersell FL in the summer
of 1995. This company provided
consulting services for businesses.
Cybersell FL developed a web page
which included: (1) information
about the company; (2) a local
Florida phone number; (3) and a
large banner that read, "'Welcome to
CyberSell! "' At this time, Cybersell

AZ did not have a web page, and the
Patent and Trade Office had not yet
approved its application for a service
mark.
On November 27, 1995, a
Cybersell AZ principal discovered
Cybersell FL's web page and sent an
e-mail to the company informing it
of Cybersell AZ's existence and
ownership of the "Cybersell" mark.
Cybersell responded to this by
changing its name and removing the
Cybersell logo from its web page.
However, the web page still included
a "'Welcome to CyberSell!"'
message.
About six weeks later, Cybersell
AZ filed suit in Arizona "alleging
trademark infingement, unfair
competition, fraud, and RICO
violations." On the same day,
Cybersell FL filed suit for declaratory judgment for Cybersell AZ's
use of the "Cybersell" name in the
United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida. The
Florida court transferred the suit to
the Arizona court, which consoli-

216 - Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

dated the two cases. Then, Cybersell
FL moved to dismiss the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction, and the
court granted Cybersell FUs motion.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the lower court's dismissal.
Court Used Recent Internet
Cases for Background
As a case of first impression, the
court began its analysis with the
examination of two recent decisions
from other circuits that represented
"opposite ends of the spectrum." In
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89
E3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth
Circuit held that a defendant who
used the Internet to conduct business
in another state was subject to
personal jurisdiction in that state.
CompuServe displayed software
files that Patterson electronically
transmitted to the computer company. CompuServe sold the products
and then sent the money to
Patterson. After a dispute,
CompuServe filed for declaratory
judgment in Ohio. The court
sustained jurisdiction over Patterson
because it reasoned that he "reached
out to Compuserve's Ohio home."
Cybersell Inc. 130 E3d at 417.
Accordingly, he "purposefully
availed" himself of the benefits of
Ohio law. Id. at 417.
In contrast, the Second Circuit
held that a defendant who advertised
or posted information on the Internet
was not subject to jurisdiction in
every state merely because the
Internet had the potential to reach
every jurisdiction. In Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 1936
ESupp. 295 (S.D. N.Y. 1996), aff'd
126 E3d 25 (2d Civ. 1997) King
owned a jazz club in Missouri with

the same name as a club in New
York. The New York club sued King
for trademark infringement in New
York; King objected to the court's
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that
since King's web page offered
information about its club, and little
else, he did not "purposefully avail
himself of the benefits of New
York." The court distinguished King,
who posted information about his
club on the Internet, from Patterson,
who sent software to CompuServe
and used the company to market his
software.
Cybersell FL did not
Purposefully Avail Itself of
Arizona Law
The district court, sitting in
diversity jurisdiction, ruled that it
was bound by Arizona law. The
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure
allow courts to assert jurisdiction
over defendants "to the maximum
extent" allowed by the state and
federal jurisdictions. 16 Aiz. R.
Civ., 4.2(a).
Before analyzing the factual
situation of the case, the court
established a three-part test to
determine whether it could exert
personal jurisdiction over defendants
who were domiciled in other states.
The test was a compilation of many
prior cases that explored jurisdictional issues. Part one asked whether
the defendant's act or transaction in
a particular state demonstrated that
he "purposefully availed" himself of
the benefits and privileges of a state.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958). Part two sought to
determine whether the cause of
action arose out of the defendant's
activities within the forum state.
Volume 10, number 3
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And, part three required that the
"exercise ofjurisdiction must be
reasonable."
Cybersell AZ relied on several
cases for support, but the court
found the cases unpersuasive
because the holdings were broader
than Cybersell AZ suggested. For
example, Cybersell AZ relied on an
Arizona case where the court stated
that a defendant should not "escape
traditional notions of jurisdiction"
because of modem technology.
EDIAS Software International,
L.L. C. v. BASIS InternationalLtd.,
947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
In EDIAS, Plaintiff claimed that
Defendant promulgated advertisements and defamatory assertions via
the Internet. Defendant had a
contract with Plaintiff, and it
solicited business in the Arizona, the
forum state. Additionally,
Defendant's employees traveled to
Arizona for business engagements
with Plaintiff. Hence, Defendant's
contact with the forum state was not
limited to Internet correspondences.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished
this case from the present one.

Unlike the defendant in EDIAS,
Cybersell FLs only contact with
Arizona was the information it
posted on its web page. As a result,
the court found EDIAS unpersuasive
for Cybersell AZ.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Cybersell FL took
no steps to "purposefully avail"
itself of Arizona's benefits, whereas
the defendant in EDIAS did. The
court found that Cybersell FL did
not conduct any commercial activity
over the Internet in Arizona.
Cybersell FL did not form contracts
with anyone in the state. Moreover,
the court found that the company did
not actively encourage Arizona
residents to use its site, there was no
evidence that Cybersell FL pursued
business in Arizona, Cybersell FL
did not advertise in Arizona, and it
derived no any income from
Arizona.
The court also noted that Arizona
citizens had no interaction with
Cybersell FL's web page. Not one
person in Arizona "hit Cybersell FL's
web site." Cybersell FL never sent
electronic messages to people or

companies in Arizona. Moreover,
there was no evidence that any
Arizonan had enlisted Cybersell FL's
web assistance. Essentially,
Cybersell FL's presence in Arizona
was negligible.
The court concluded that posting
information on the Internet without
taking steps to purposefully avail
oneself of the laws of the forum
state did not establish personal
jurisdiction. Since the court concluded that Cybersell FL's contacts
with Arizona did not amount to
purposeful activity in the state, the
court stopped its analysis without
examining the second and third
prongs of its test. The case did not
change any preexisting laws about
personal jurisdiction simply because
this case involved an Internet.
Instead, the court demanded the
same level of minimum contacts that
it would in other cases. Accordingly,
the court concluded that Cybersell
FL did not establish the requisite
minimum contacts with Arizona, and
affirmed the lower court's dismissal.
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Medical Buyer Fails to Prove that Letter
Evidenced a Valid Requirements Contract
by Karina Zabicki
In Orchard Group, Inc. v.
Konica Medical Corp., 135 F.3d
421 (6th Cir. 1998), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court holding: (1) when a
principal allows its agent to modify
existing contracts, confirm contracts
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and conclude contract negotiations
between the principal and third
parties without further approval, the
doctrine of apparent authority will
bind the principal to the contract
formed by its agent; (2) the letter
sent by the Konica Medical Corporation agent to an Orchard Group

Incorporated agent was not a valid
contract because it neither contained
a quantity term in compliance with
the Statute of Frauds, nor met the
definition of a "requirements
contract" because nothing in the
letter indicated how a quantity term
could be implied, and (3) the letter
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